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ABSTRACT  ARTICLE INFO 
Introduction: This study aims to measure the efficiency of village
government spending and examine the effects of village transfers (Dana
Desa) and institutional properties on its efficiency. Background
Problems: The village law has endowed extra grants to village
governments, which questions if the villages are prepared to adequately
handle large increases in funding. Novelty: While previous studies
address the misappropriation in spending within the municipal
dimension, this study explores the spending efficiency of the autonomous
sub-municipal governments and explains the impacts of both lump-sum
grants and bureaucracy factors on spending efficiency. Research
Methods: This study analyzes the Indonesian 2014 Village Govern-
ments’ dataset, using the meta-cost frontier in order to measure village
spending efficiency, then it probes the causal impacts of endowed fiscal
transfers and bureaucratic factors on the obtained efficiency. Findings/
Results: The results suggest that granting direct transfers would
exacerbate the spending inefficiencies of autonomous villages. Adminis-
trative factors such as a large bureaucracy and a lack of bureaucratic
capacity within the body of village governments positively affect
spending inefficiencies. Conclusion: The result of this research reflects
that there is a need to evaluate the village governance policy to increase
spending efficiencies, specifically focusing on the adequacy of village
institutions to handle village transfers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Indonesian decentralization reform is gradually 
progressing, with the fragmentation of respon-
sibilities within government authorities (Smoke 
and Lewis, 1996). This decentralization reform 
comes with various law packages, the most 
recent being Law 6/2014 on Village Government. 
Its implementation is progressing nationwide 
and has been implemented at the sub-municipal 
level. The law formalizes the creation of village 
governments, which are quasi-federal structures 
in the articulation of democratic legitimacy and 
public service provisions at a sub-municipal 
level (Hlepas, Kersting, Kuhlmann, Swianiewicz 
& Teles, 2018). 
The village law greatly increases village 
budgets, injecting an additional 21 trillion rupiah 
(about US$ 1.5 billion) into village budgets in 
2014 as top-down transfers (Aspinall & Rohman, 
2017). These transfers account more than 70% of 
rural/village government revenues. Given the 
newness of such large endowments from central 
sources, there have been somewhat limited stu-
dies into village financial management systems 
that question their preparedness to adequately 
handle large increases in funding. The qualitative 
study from the Corruption Eradication Commis-
sion finds that unclear regulations and guidance 
about village transfer spending, and the lack of 
capacity of the executive body in ruralgovern-
ments, have potentially caused government 
expenditure misallocations.1 Antlöv, Wetterberg 
& Dharmawan (2016) argue that the village 
budget is usually overstated. From the expe-
rience of the National Program of Village 
Empowerment from 2006 to 2014, they found 
that there is a significant gap between a village’s 
proposed budget and the budget’s realization. 
                                                            
1  Report from Indonesia Corruption Eradication Commis-
sion (2015) titled “village fund management: allocation of 
village fund and transfers” (Pengelolaan Keuangan Desa: 
Alokasi Dana Desadan Dana Desa). 
Lewis (2015) provides empirical evidence of the 
flaw in village transfers, for example, poor 
villages get fewer transfers. However, there is no 
study to explore the potential abuse of the 
transfers from the side of the village govern-
ments’ expenditure. The studies on addressing 
misappropriation in spending are abundant but 
limited to the dimension of the sub-national or 
municipal level (e.g. Akai, Sato, & Yamashita, 
2001; Boetti, Piacenza, & Turati, 2012; De 
Borger & Kerstens, 1996).  
Thus, this paper tries to fill the gap above by 
investigating the efficiency of village govern-
ment spending post the implementation of Law 
6/2014 on Village Government.  By analyzing 
the parametric spending inefficiency from 
80,179 Indonesian villages in 2014, the paper 
shows that autonomous villages have higher 
spending efficiencies than the villages with non-
autonomous status. The autonomous villages are 
the villages with independent governance that 
have the rights to village transfers. Meanwhile, 
the non-autonomous villages (kelurahan) are 
sub-governments under the responsibility of the 
municipal governments (Martinez-Bravo, 2014). 
It appears that the independency to govern 
promotes the efficiency of public spending. 
Likewise, granting direct top-down transfers 
improves villages’ government spending effi-
ciency, albeit bureaucracy factors such as 
ballooning bureaucracy and the lack of the 
village officials’ capacity worsen efficiency. 
The first half of this article discusses the 
background and framework of the village 
decentralization framework and its transfers, 
together with theoretical support for the effects 
of bureaucracy on its efficiency. The second half 
of the paper provides empirical results. 
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Table 1. Positioning of this study 
Article Sample Method Key findings 
Boetti, Piacenza, & 
Turatti (2012) 
2005 Italian 
municipalities 
SFA & DEA Fiscally autonomous municipal is more 
efficient 
De Borger & 
Kerstens (1996) 
Belgium 
municipalities 
FDH, DEA, & SF • Unconditional grants reduce municipal 
efficiency 
• Education and tax rates increase 
efficiency 
Borge, Falch, & 
Tovmo (2008) 
Norwegian 
municipalities 
Service Efficiency (Gap of 
Baseline & production) 
• Domination of political parties increase 
efficiency 
• High revenue led to less efficient 
This study Indonesian sub- 
municipalities 
(village 
governments) 
Meta-cost frontier • Grants to villages increase efficiency 
• Autonomous villages are more efficient
• Bureaucracy sizes reduce efficiency 
Source: Author’s own table 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Indonesian Village Decentralization 
Framework 
Indonesia’s decentralization policy began after 
the collapse of the authoritarian regime of the 
Soeharto era in 1998. The enacted decentrali-
zation law in 1999enforced the full transfer of 
authority from central to local governments. 
There are two significant amendments to the 
1999 decentralization law; Law 32/2004 on 
Local Government and Law 23/2014 on Local 
Governance. Despite the progressive stage of 
decentralization, the central and local govern-
ments are still at the stage of finding the proper 
fragmentation for the balance of authority 
(Aspinall, 2003).  The granting of autonomy was 
supposed to reduce development inequality 
between the central and local governments, and 
between the rich and poor regions (Roudo & 
Chalil, 2016). However, the rising inequality 
between rural and urban areas propels the public 
demands for expanding decentralization to the 
village level (Antlöv, 2003). 
As a hurried response, the government 
introduced Law 6/2014 on Village Government. 
The law acknowledges that village governments 
(pemerintahan desa) have the right to govern 
and to provide public services based on their 
own needs and circumstances, within their 
administrative boundaries. 
Village governments have responsibilities to 
provide certain public services for their "local" 
indigenous people. Government Regulation 
43/2014 provides the details of the village 
governments’ authority, which are: (1) basic 
public services (health and education), for 
instance, cram schools (taman bacaan), maternal 
health posts, emergency units (posyandu), or 
others; (2) village-scale infrastructure and 
transportation, for instance, agro-irrigation, local 
markets, village roads, and others. Following 
these authorities and functions, the central 
government decided to transfer the funds using 
an intergovernmental transfer scheme. 
Law 6/2014 obliges the central government 
to share at least 10% of the total fiscal transfers 
in the national budget with the village 
governments.2 The use of village transfers is not 
                                                            
2  The history of village budgets started from the first 
decentralization policy in Law 22/1999. The law stated 
that villages could receive government transfers for their 
financing. Further, it was also endorsed in Government 
Regulation 72/2005, which authorizes the transfers to 
villages from municipal accounts. However, the transfers 
are not applied thoroughly in all regions. Rising demands 
for village autonomy rights in the recent development 
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explicit; however, 30% of these transfers should 
go to village government operations and 70% for 
capital development spending. 3  Lewis (2015) 
shows the calculation for village transfers, which 
can be perceived as a general formula with 
several demographic and geographic variables. 
Based on the calculation process, the nature of 
village transfers is close to lump-sum grants 
since they do not represent the real needs for the 
villages’ development. Furthermore, Lewis 
(2015) suggests that village transfers are 
unequally distributed. He finds that villages with 
high levels of poverty receive less funding than 
villages with greater access to funding, 
especially oil and gas transfers. In his remarks, 
the villages’ service responsibilities are unclearly 
defined and the villages’ public financial systems 
are inadequately prepared to handle the transfers.  
On the other hand, Maharjan (2014) suggests 
that the inadequate capacity within the village 
governments is a result of the lack of resources 
and budgets to train the village apparatuses. 
Despite the limitation of resources and capacity, 
village communities give above average scores 
for the performance of their villages’ apparatuses 
for capturing the villages’ needs, providing 
services, and accountability. He remarks that 
future village transfers should be increased to 
overcome the local problems. 
The above literature shows a problem with 
the village transfers. First, the village transfers 
potentially exacerbate the efficiency of public 
services due to the inadequate capacity of the 
villages’ governments. Second, the village 
transfers are essential to source funding for the 
villages’ development. The following section 
explains the theoretical underpinning of the 
impact of village transfers and village capacity’s 
relationship with spending efficiency.  
                                                                                         
enforced the stipulation of Law 6/2014 that mandated the 
village transfers.     
3 It is mandated on Government Regulation 43/2014. 
2. Theoretical Underpinning: Maximizing 
Bureaucracy Model 
The model for maximizing bureaucracy 
(Niskanen, 1968) is appropriate to explain the 
impacts of fiscal transfers and institutions on 
spending efficiency. The model starts with the 
assumption that the bureaucracy maximizes the 
total budget given the utility demands and costs, 
subject to production constraints. The total 
budget is derived from the marginal values of 
taxpayers with the decreasing marginal utility of 
public goods’ consumption Q.  
ܶܤ = ܽܳ − ܾܳଶ (3) 
Then the bureaucrats who provide public 
goods face a constraint, in that the total cost of 
providing public goods must not exceed the total 
budget (TB), the “no fat” bureaucracy indicates 
that the total budget should cover the minimum 
total costs (Niskanen, 1968). Assuming that the 
aggregate cost function has a linear production4:  
ܶܥ = ܿܳ (4) 
In Figure 2, the equilibrium Q is located at 
= ௔ି௖௕  , and the maximized budget leads to an 
equilibrium ܳ = ௔ି௖ଶ௕ . Moesen & Van 
Cauwenberge (2000) extend this model by 
adding a fiscal residuum as a difference between 
the budget and the costs incurred. They explore 
the later version of Niskanen’s model, where 
bureaucrats are inefficient producers, generating 
a utility for bureaucrats that take the form of, for 
example, coffee breaks, political appointments, 
and complicated procedures. The utility curve of 
bureaucrats intersects the fiscal residuum curve 
(in the lower panel, Figure 2), and produces 
public goods at level Q*, which is lower than the 
social optimum level ( ܳ = ௔ି௖௕ ). 
                                                            
4 I assume a linear model to simplify the intuition. By 
assuming the aggregate cost function is linear, then the 
production cost for bureaucrats is uniform. One could 
expect that the sign is positive to ensure a positive scale 
economy, which indicates that decentralization increases 
the size of government. 
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The effect of increasing the capacity of the 
bureaucrats will increase the total budget, since: 
ப୘୆
பେ = 	
ப୊(୆,େ)
பେ
ப୘୆
ப୊(୆,େ) =
ଵ
ଶ
ப୊(୆,େ)
பେ ቂ
ொ
୊(୆,େ)ቃ
ଶ
 (7) 
Hence, the performance of the bureaucrats is 
a monotonic increase, so ப୊(୆,େ)பେ is positive. 
Therefore, TB increases, leading to a new 
equilibrium Q” where the provided service 
goods are larger than Q in Niskanen’s model. 
Now we set the hypothesis as described below. 
H2: Bureaucracy’s capacity improves govern-
ment efficiency 
In contrast, bureaucracy’s size has a diminishing 
return on bureaucratic performance, which 
changes the sign. 
ப୘୆
ப୆ = 	
ப୊(୆,େ)
ப୆
ப୘୆
ப୊(୆,େ) = 	−
ଵ
ଶ
ப୊(୆,େ)
ப୆ ቂ
ொ
୊(୆,େ)ቃ
ଶ
 (8) 
The new equilibrium exists at the point c, the 
lower panel of Figure 2. Increasingthe bureau-
cracy’s size decreases the total budget curve to 
TB”. By keeping the utility of the bureaucrats 
unchanged, the provided public goods falls to 
Q”, which is lower than the initial Niskanen’s 
model, Q*. Now we set the hypothesis as 
described below. 
H3:  Increasing the bureaucracy’s size reduces 
government efficiency 
The theoretical framework above demons-
trates that extra budget funds increase the social 
optimal of providing public goods; conversely, 
the bureaucracy has two effects: increasing the 
size of the administration negatively affects the 
social optimal of delivering public goods; but 
bureaucratic quality creates a better condition. In 
the next step, these arguments are tested by 
using empirical data from Indonesian village 
governments. 
METHOD, DATA, AND ANALYSIS 
1. Measuring the Cost Efficiency of Rural 
Government Expenditures 
The studies on measuring the efficiency of 
government are abundant (e.g., see: Akai, Sato, 
& Yamashita, 2001; Battese & Coelli, 1992; and 
Boetti, et al., 2012). For each i producers, total 
expenditure (E), the quantity of produced 
outputs, and the input price; the cost frontier is 
expressed as: 
ܧ௜ ≥ ܥ(ݕ௜, ݓ௜	; ߚ)exp	(ݒ௜) (9) 
Where ܧ௜ = ݓ௜ݔ௜ = ∑ ݓ௡௜ݔ௡௜௡  is expenditure 
incurred by the producer i, i = 1,2,..,I ; yi is a 
vector of N outputs produced by producer i, 
ܥ(ݕ௜, ݓ௜; ߚ) is the cost frontier, w is the input 
price, which is assumed to be monetized, and β 
is the vector parameters to be estimated; exp(vi) 
is the random stochastic shocks that varies for 
each producer. CEi is the cost efficiency of 
producer i, which is evaluated as follows: 
ܥܧ௜ = ஼(௬೔,௪೔;ఉ)ୣ୶୮	(௩೔)ா೔  (10) 
Where cost efficiency is a ratio of the 
minimum cost attainable in an environment 
characterized by exp(vi). Assumingthe equality 
of revenue and expenditure, procured expen-
diture is equal to minimum cost if CEi = 1. 
Ashortfall of observed expenditure to minimum 
feasible cost is shown by 0≤CE<1 (Kumbhakar 
& Lovell, 2000). 
For the estimation strategy, this study 
employs stochasticfrontier analysis (SFA) which 
is later modified tometa-SFA. SFA is reasonably 
robust when applying a sizeable cross-sectional 
dataset compared with other frontier analysis, 
such as data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
(Hjalmarsson, Kumbhakar, & Herhmati, 1996).   
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2. Model Specification 
The model specification follows Battesse & 
Coelli (1992): 
ln ܥ௜ = 	ߚ࢏ ln ௜ܺ + ε௜ (11) 
ε௜ = ߜ௜ + ߤ (12) 
ߜ௜ = ߙܼ + 	߱ (13) 
Where Ci is the total revenues of village i, as a 
proxy of total expenditure, in this condition, 
procured expenditures should meet total 
revenues. xirepresents output factors that are 
provided by ruralgovernments. µ is random 
noise, and δ is the inefficiency terms, both are 
i.i.d. The function is return to scale and follows 
the Cobb-Douglas rule. In the next step, the 
inefficiency terms are products of corruption, 
monitoring, size of the government (in matrix Z). 
For efficiency’s measurement, the statistic-
programming measures cost inefficiency as:  
CE୧ 	= Eሼexp(−u୧) |ε୧ሽ (14) 
Where the estimated cost inefficiency has an 
exponential distribution, which varies from 1 
(minimum cost) to infinity (Battesse & Coelli, 
1992). Following the formula of Khumbakar & 
Lovell (2000), cost efficiency takes the form of 
the inverse of the estimated cost inefficiency:  
CE୧ 	= Eሼexp(u୧) |ε୧ሽ (15) 
Therefore, cost efficiency varies from 0 
(perfectly inefficient) to 1 (perfectly efficient).   
3. Meta-Cost Frontier Approach  
The meta-cost frontier approach allows us to 
estimate the cost efficiency in different given 
groups within the data. The method of the meta-
cost frontier is similar to the cost frontier’s 
estimation but the meta-cost frontier estimates 
the efficiency by groups. Battese & Rao’s (2002) 
article presents the detailed methods. For j 
groups, the cost frontier becomes:  
E୧ ≥ C൫y୧(୨), w୧(୨)	; β(୨)൯exp	(v୧(୨))	 (16)	
Parameters ݓ௜(௝); ߚ(௝)  are governed under the 
meta-cost frontier ݓ௜; ߚ  with the following 
restriction: 
w୧(୨); β(୨) ≤ w୧; β (17) 
Therefore, the evaluated cost efficiency (within-
group) becomes: 
CE୧(୨) = େ൫୷౟(ౠ),୵౟(ౠ);ஒ(ౠ)൯ୣ୶୮	(୴౟(ౠ))୉౟(ౠ)  (18) 
The following equation represents the evaluated 
estimated efficiency within j groups: 
ܥܧ௜(௝) 	= ܧ൛݁ݔ݌൫ݑ௜(௝)൯ |ߝ௜(௝)ൟ (19) 
 
Source:  Battese, Rao & O’Donnell (2004) with author’s 
modification 
Figure 2. Illustration of Meta-Cost Frontier Analysis 
Village governments can choose their admi-
nistrative status, whether they want to be autono-
mous (village government) or not autonomous 
(kelurahan/urban communities). 5  Since the 
village dataset contains all the sub-municipal 
governments, I divided the data into village and 
non-village groups. As the first step for each 
group, the calculation lists the sub-municipal 
governments which are the most inefficient, and 
the most efficient, in spending. The second step 
models the effect of bureaucracy on the 
inefficiency of ruralgovernments. 
                                                            
5 Paragraph 1, article 11, Law 6/2014 mentions that villages 
can change their administrative status to urban commu-
nities (kelurahan) through the village government’s initia-
tion and considering the village community’s aspirations.   
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4. Data Description 
The Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics 
(BPS) provides an enormous dataset for the 2014 
Village Development Survey (Potensi Desa 
2014) covering all the village administrations in 
Indonesia (80,179 observations). The dataset is 
divided into two groups, the autonomous village 
(desa) group and the non-autonomous village 
(kelurahan) group. The autonomous villages 
account for 88.55% of the total observations and 
the non-autonomous villages account for 11.45%. 
The employed variables are organized into three 
categories: expenditure (Ei), output (yi), and 
efficiency variables (Z). 
Expenditure: Holding the equality, the total 
revenue of the village government is a proxy of 
its total expenditure. It is a sum of own-source 
revenue, grants/contributions from higher tiers 
of government, and village transfers. 
Output: There are two approaches to output, 
first is the physical output approach and second 
is the expenditure approach. The variables are as 
follows: 
a. Education infrastructure; is the sum of the 
schools build by village governments, includ-
ing playgroups, informal elementary schools, 
local libraries (taman bacaan), training and 
vocation schools, and madrasas.  
b. Health infrastructure; is the sum of maternal 
health posts, local polyclinics, drugstores, 
and integrated service posts (posyandu).  
c. Religious infrastructure; is the sum of mos-
ques, mushallas, churches, shrines, and other 
prayer buildings, to which the village govern-
ment has contributed. 
d. Village co-op; is the sum of the co-ops or 
unions for the village’s economy and 
development, including village-integrated co-
ops (KUD), micro-industry and craft co-ops 
(kopinkra), micro-credit and banking co-ops 
(kospin), and other related co-ops or unions. 
e. Capital spending; expenditure for capital, 
land, assets or physical goods by the village 
government in the same year. 
f. Overhead spending; expenditure for paying 
wages, salaries, offices and related spending 
for government operations. 
g. Other spending; expenditure on other spend-
ing, that is, grants, tax, interest, and others. 
Efficiency Explanatory Variables 
a. Portion of micro-transfer; shares of the rural-
micro transfer to total revenue in a village; 
b. Ad-hoc village representative institution; the 
institution functions as a parliament, 
consisting of community representatives, its 
authority includes legislation of the village’s 
regulations; monitoring government plans, 
the budget and its execution; and it is a place 
for the community to voice their opinions and 
interests. The dataset is binary (one = repre-
sentative available, zero = not available);. 
c. Village security officers; the number of secu-
rity officers (hansip/linmas) hired by village 
governments. Registered village apparatus; 
thenumber of officials in the village govern-
ment. Summation of both these variables 
serves as the proxy for the size of the govern-
ment. 
d. Education of village leader and education of 
village secretary; indicates the capacity of the 
village government. The ordinal data is 
explained by the following: (one = never 
went to school; two = went to school but did 
not graduate from elementary school; three = 
elementary graduate; four = junior high 
graduate; five = high school graduate; six = 
associate graduate; seven = bachelor 
graduate; eight = master’s graduate; nine = 
doctoral graduate).  
Table 2 presents the statistical summary. 
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Table 2. Statistical Summary of Dataset 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Input     
Total village revenue  
(in million rupiah) 
312.86 530.19 0 17,282 
Output     
Educational infrastructure built under village gov`t authority (number 
of building) 
2.72 4.24 0 129 
Health infrastructure built under village gov`t authority (number of 
building) 
4.57 5.01 0 104 
Religion related infrastructure built under village gov`t authority 
(number of building) 
11.1 14.2 0 219 
Village co-ops 0.88 2.64 0 101 
Expenditure     
Spending on capital, assets, land, buildings, etc. (million rupiah) 132.80 574.27 0 9950 
Spending for routine activities (wages, offices, electricity, phone, etc) 
/ overhead spending (million rupiah)  
130.33 295.61 0 9797 
Spending for others (ex. non-direct spending, grants, awards, tax, 
interest, etc) 
51.81 252.07 0 9630 
Exogenous variable      
Portion of micro-transfer to village gov’t revenue 0.45 0.34 0 1 
Existence of ad-hoc village representative’s institution (Y/N) 0.96 0.32 0 1 
Number of village security officers 12.64 14.97 0 210 
Number of apparatus registered in village  12.28 8.68 0 99 
Education of village government’s leader 5.22 1.17 1 9 
Education of village government’s secretary 5.34 1.08 1 9 
Observation 80,179 
Autonomous villages (Desa) 71,000 (88.55%) 
Non-autonomous villages (Kelurahan) 9179 (11.45%) 
Source: Data analysis 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
At first, the meta-cost frontier analysis estimates 
the cost efficiency of village governments’ 
expenditure. The observations are classified into 
two groups; the first one is the (autonomous) 
village government and the second one is the 
urban community (kelurahan- non-autonomous). 
Each group has different decision-making 
processes since urban communities do not have 
autonomy for discretionary spending. After 
estimating the cost frontier curve for each group, 
a meta-cost frontier curve is constructed. There 
are two model approaches. Model (1) is the 
output-approach and model (2) is the expen-
diture-approach, for the robustness check.6 Table 
3 and Table 4 present the results respectively. 
The produced cost efficiency under exponential 
distribution has the maximum value of one for 
perfect efficiency.7 
                                                            
6  Input price is indexed, since for the output approach 
mainly physical outputs are used as output variables. In 
Indonesia, physical outputs (construction, buildings, 
roads, etc.) have been standardized through government 
regulation. On the other hand, the expenditure approach 
does not necessarily impose an input price. 
7 Programming on SFA produced a different scale of cost 
efficiency, which follows the estimation technique by 
Battese and Coelli (1992) where CE={1,Infinity} where 
perfect efficiency takes the value as one. I scale the 
efficiency measurement by taking the inverse of CE, to be 
consistent with CE under Kumbhakar and Lovell’s (2003) 
approach, where CE = {0.1}. 
10 Chalil 
Figure 3 plots the CE for village, non-village and 
all observations using the output approach. 
Figure 4 shows a similar presentation using the 
expenditure approach. Table 5 presents the 
statistical summaries of cost efficiency. From the 
mean efficiency scores, an autonomous village is 
22% more efficient than a non-autonomous 
village (kelurahan). This means that the autono-
my status of the government can lead to 
efficiency. On the other hand, urban community 
(kelurahan) status is non-autonomous and 
entirely controlled by the upper tier of govern-
ment; resulting in mean-efficiency scoresthat are 
lower than those of the autonomous village. 
However, a non-autonomous unit is 6% more 
efficient than an autonomous unit in its expen-
diture approach, which implies a smaller 
deficit/surplus and more care taken to balance 
expenditure. Through the lens of public spending, 
it is efficient, but it is worth noting that this 
approach does not represent the effectiveness of 
the expenditure. 
Table 3. Efficiency Estimation and Its Determinants (Output Approach) 
Variables Autonomous village group 
Non- autonomous 
village group 
All (meta-
frontier) 
Panel 1: Meta-Cost Frontier Model    
Dep.Var: Village revenue    
Educational infrastructure 0.09*** 0.14*** 0.10*** 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) 
Health infrastructure 0.26*** 0.19*** 0.25*** 
 (0.01) (0.08) (0.01) 
Religion Related infrastructure 0.12*** 0.25*** 0.12*** 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) 
Village co-ops 0.28*** 0.13*** 0.28*** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
Constant 2.96*** 1.84*** 2.92*** 
 (0.08) (0.47) (0.08) 
Panel 2: Inefficiency Model Eሼexp(ݑ௜) |ߝ௜ሽ    
Dep.Var: Inefficiency score    
Shares of micro-transfers -11.23*** 4.00*** -10.58*** 
 (0.48) (0.66) (0.45) 
Village representatives (Y/N) 1.27 -0.34 0.36 
 (1.14) (0.74) (0.73) 
Apparatus per village family 20.53*** 40.61*** 20.57*** 
 (1.10) (9.89) (0.01) 
Leader’s education 0.03 -0.04 0.02 
 (0.03) (0.12) (0.03) 
Vice-leader’s education -0.03 -0.1 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.12) (0.08) 
Constant -1.86 1.99 -0.91 
 (1.17) (1.32) (0.77) 
Observations 15,101 362 15,463 
Log-likelihood -18,000 -347.5 -18,419 
Lambda 0.77 0.46 0.76 
Notes: Cost frontier. Cost frontier model is carried using log transformation. All inputs and outputs are indexed by 
population. Technical efficiency is scaled as exponential distributions. Standard errors in brackets; *** denotes 
significance at 1% level, **at 5% and * at 10%. 
Source: Data analysis 
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Table 4. Efficiency Estimation and Its Determinants (Expenditures Approach) 
Variables Autonomous village group 
Non- autonomous 
village group 
All (meta-
frontier) 
Panel 1: Meta-Cost Frontier Model    
Dep.Var: Village revenue    
Capital spending 0.31*** 0.15*** 0.30*** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
Overhead spending 0.30*** 0.42*** 0.38*** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
Other spending  0.14*** 0.07*** 0.14*** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
Constant 0.70*** 0.21*** 0.70*** 
 (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) 
Panel 2: Inefficiency Model Eሼexp(ݑ௜) |ߝ௜ሽ    
Dep.Var: Inefficiency score    
Shares of micro-transfers -2.72*** -6.14*** -2.74*** 
 (0.05) (0.67) (0.05) 
Village representatives (Y/N) 0.05 1.63 0.04 
 (0.14) (1.26) (0.13) 
Apparatus per village family 5.34*** 31.60*** 5.22*** 
 (0.22) (9.81) (0.22) 
Leader’s education -0.02* -0.08 -0.02* 
 (0.01) (0.15) (0.01) 
Vice-leader’s education 0.01 -0.17 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.17) (0.01) 
Constant -0.84*** 0.07 -0.83*** 
 (0.15) (1.89) (0.15) 
Observations 46,026 566 46,592 
Log-likelihood -33,910 -465 -34,547 
Lambda 0.34 0.45 0.36 
Notes:  Cost frontier model is carried using log transformation. All inputs and outputs are indexed by population. Technical 
efficiency is scaled as exponential distributions. Standard errors in brackets; *** denotes significance at 1% level, **at 
5% and * at 10%. 
Source: Data analysis 
Table 5. Efficiency Summary 
  Autonomous villages 
Non-autonomous 
villages All 
Mean TE (Output based) 0.80 0.58 0.80 
 TE (Expenditure based) 0.68 0.75 0.68 
SD TE (Output based) 0.19 0.23 0.19 
 TE (Expenditure based) 0.19 0.22 0.19 
Min TE (Output based) 0.02 0.02 0.01 
 TE (Expenditure based) 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Max TE (Output based) 1.00 0.90 1.00 
 TE (Expenditure based) 0.98 0.97 0.98 
N (Output based) 15,101 362 15,463 
 (Expenditure based) 46,026 566 45,592 
Notes: Efficiency scores are calculated using the inverse of the estimated cost inefficiency such as CE୧ = Eሼexp(−ݑ௜) |ߝ௜ሽ 
Source: Data analysis 
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Source: Author’ analysis Source: Author’ analysis 
Figure 3. Distribution of Efficiency Scores (output based) Figure 4.  Distribution of Efficiency Scores 
(Expenditure based) 
The most efficient village from the calcula-
tions is Condong Catur Village, Sleman Regency, 
DI Yogyakarta Province, with an efficiency score 
of 0.995. The Ministry of Villages, Development 
of Disadvantaged Regions and Transmigration 
also confirmed Condong Catur Village as the 
village with the best fund management practices 
in 2015.8 Based on the cost approach, the most 
efficient village is Mandala Barat Village, Mua-
ra Jambi Regency, Jambi Province. In contrast, 
the least efficient villages are Tiangau Village, 
Anambas Regency, Riau Island Province and 
Bawomataluo Village, South Nias Municipality, 
North Sumatra Province with efficiency scores 
of 0.014 and 0.002, respectively. 
Table 3 and Table 4 panel 2 provide the 
regression results of the efficiency scores with 
their determinants. Three results are presented, 
for the village group, non-village group, and all 
group. 
The first hypothesis states that unconditional 
grants (village transfers) improve government 
efficiency. The coefficient shows a significant 
and negative relationship of increasing shares of 
village transfers on inefficiency scores. 9 The 
                                                            
8  Republika (2017), Sleman has a successfully managing 
village fund (Sleman dinilai sukses kelola dana desa). 
Retrieved from https://republika.co.id/berita/ekonomi/ 
desa-bangkit/19/01/17/plgwf3368-sleman-dinilai-sukses-
kelola-dana-desa 
9  Note that programming of frontier analysis regresses the 
Technical Inefficiency which takes the value one 
(efficient) to infinity (inefficient). 
result implies that a percent of increase of 
village transfer shares cut around 2,67%-2,77% 
of inefficiency scores. By comparing the 
magnitude of the impacts of the village transfers, 
the village group has a lower magnitude than the 
non-village one, which implies village transfers 
positively affect government spendings’ effi-
ciency, especially for the non-village govern-
ments. Similar effects are observed with the 
expenditure approach. Figure 5 and Figure 6 
show the relationship. 
The existence of monitoring and 
representatives of the community on the villages’ 
governing bodies should reduce inefficiency. 
The likelihood estimations do not report any 
significance. It seems that the presence of an ad-
hoc representative does not have any effect. 
Figures 7 and 8 show that, for the distribution of 
CE by the availability of representatives, the 
result seems ambiguous since, from the graph, 
there is no significant difference in CE’s distri-
bution between an available representative 
government and the not-available one. The 
plausible explanation is that enlarging the 
participation of the community in the govern-
mental process may increase the efficiency of 
spending. However, if the community’s members 
are not well educated, the effect may be the 
opposite. Better-educated people may be also 
more altruistic as leaders, and thus they are less 
likely to engage in resources misappropriation 
(Mansuri & Rao, 2012). 
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Source: Data analysis 
Relation Between Efficiency Score and Portion of Village Transfer by Village Status 
Figure 5. Output Approach Figure 6. Expenditure Approach 
 
Source: Data analysis 
CE distribution on representative not-available rural government (left part) and representative 
available rural government (right part) 
Figure 7. Output Approach Figure 8. Expenditure Approach 
 
The validation of the second hypothesis is 
about the correlation between expenditure 
efficiency and the size of the bureaucracy. 
Adding a unit of government officers per family 
increases output inefficiency by 20.57 units and 
expenditure inefficiency by 5.22 units, which 
implies that increasing the size of the rural 
government’s administration distorts expenditure 
efficiency. The magnitude is greater for non-
village governments where the difference of the 
coefficients is 20 points for the output approach 
and 26 points for the expenditure approach. This 
finding shows that increasing the numbers of 
apparatus leads to less efficient government 
spending, and the effect is greater for the non-
autonomous government. The results confirm the 
second hypothesis, where an increase in the size 
of the bureaucracy leads to spending inefficiency. 
Kau & Rubin (1981) and Treisman (2000) 
confirmed similar findings. Figure 9 and Figure 
10 present the two-way plot showing a negative 
relation between the bureaucracy’s size and its 
efficiency.  
Finally, the third hypothesis, which seeks 
correlations between bureaucracy’s capacity and 
expenditure efficiency. In Table 3, the education 
of the village leader and his/her deputy has no 
significant effect on production efficiency. In 
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Table 4, the education of the leader, as a proxy 
of bureaucratic capacity, influences the 
inefficiency negatively. The impact of education 
only matters for the (autonomous) village 
government. These findings are aligned with 
Aspinall & Rohman’s (2017) recommendation, 
where the capacity of the bureaucracy improves 
the spending efficiency, especially when locals 
can elect their leaders according to their ability. 
Note that only autonomous village governments 
can hold local elections, non-autonomous 
villages cannot. For a non-autonomous village, 
the upper tier government directly appoints the 
village’s leader. 
CONCLUSION 
Decentralization reforms in Indonesia reach a 
new level by acknowledging the autonomy of 
the village government, the smallest unit in the 
government structure. Following this reform, the 
central government allocates top-down transfers 
to the villages, yet these transfers are prone to 
corruption and inefficiencies.  
The findings show that the villages could 
efficiently spend their expenditure, with effi-
ciency scores above 68%. The village govern-
ments perform better if they have autonomous 
status and have full control over their village 
transfers. Several factors may explain this 
efficiency. Increasing the number of bureaucrats 
diminishes village spending efficiency, as 
expected. In contrast, increasing the bureaucratic 
capacity appears to improve the spending 
efficiency, even though the statistical results are 
only convincing for the group of autonomous 
villages.  
This study’s contribution is twofold. As a 
pioneering move, Indonesia expanded its 
decentralization policy by granting autonomy to 
the sub-municipal administrations. Thus, given 
the experience and policy practice in Indonesia, 
this study is the first to explore the efficiency of 
spending by the autonomous sub-municipal 
governments. Second, the paper contributes by 
explaining the impacts of both the lump-sum 
grants and the bureaucracy on determining 
expenditure efficiency. This paper complements 
the works by Boetti et al (2012) and De Borger 
& Kerstens (1996).10 
 
 
Source: Data analysis 
Technical Efficiency of output approach (Y-axis) versus Size of Bureaucracy (X-axis) 10 
Figure 9. Output Approach                         Figure 10. Expenditure Approach 
                                                            
10 Both Boetti et al. (2012) and De Borger & Kerstens (1996) explore the efficiency of municipal/city governments by 
employing data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). These techniques produce the 
parametric and non-parametric measurement of inefficiency terms, albeit assuming there is a technology homogeneity 
among the observations. This paper uses a meta-frontier approach that allows for technology heterogeneity among the 
observations. 
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STUDY LIMITATION AND POLICY 
IMPLICATION 
This study has three major limitations. First, this 
study employed village survey data from the 
National Statistics Agency. The budget data 
contains self-reporting assessments from the 
village governments, which arguably need to be 
validated by the upper tier governments. There-
fore, the problem of measurement errors may 
arise during the empirical analysis. The solution 
to correct this problem is to combine the 
maximum likelihood estimators in the first step 
to estimate the efficiency scores, and use 
instrumental variable analysis in the second step 
to evaluate the efficiency determinants. Second, 
this study limits the measurement of government 
efficiency to the view of parametric cost 
efficiency, while assuming the price of providing 
public goods is indexed. However, it does not 
apply in real practice since the government’s 
spending efficiency may come from the result of 
effective management, organization, and cheaper 
costs for delivering public services. Third, the 
paper uses the village leaders’ and deputy 
leaders’ education as the representative variable 
for the villages’ bureaucratic capacity, which is 
challenging. The bureaucracy’s capacity is a 
general concept, which needs a comprehensive 
measurement. A detailed study to measure the 
broad meaning of bureaucratic capacity should 
take place as a milestone in future research 
agendas, which later could be associated with 
the village government’s efficiency.    
The results suggest several policy implica-
tions, for instance creating a lean government 
structure for village governments and focusing 
on capital expenditure and physical infrastruc-
ture. Extending decentralization to the village 
level and increasing village transfers are appro-
priate policies; nevertheless, strengthening the 
current regulations, capacity and institutions are 
indispensable. 
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